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INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE EISLER CASE
PHILIP E. JACOBt
Two critical issues were raised by the attempt of the United States
Government to secure the extradition of Gerhart Eisler, the Communist
alien who jumped bail and fled the United States after being convicted
both of contempt of Congress and of making false statements to secure
an exit permit. The first concerns the test of "double criminality."
This test derives from extradition laws and treaties which specify that
a person shall be extradited only if the act of which he is accused is a
crime by the law both of the state which is demanding and the state
which is asked to grant extradition.' The unhesitating decision of a
British magistrate to reject the United States' plea demonstrated the
serious rift which has developed between English and American ex-
tradition practice in applying the test of "double criminality" to deter-
mine whether offenses are extraditable.
Secondly, the case reveals the uncertainty of legal practice with
reference to extraditability when the extradition proceedings are
challenged as being politically inspired. 2 Eisler resisted extradition on
the grounds that the United States was seeking his surrender to perse-
cute him for his Communist activities. The British decision avoided
this issue and the actual effect of law and treaty in preventing extradi-
tion for ulterior political purposes remains ill-defined. But in view of
the increasing bitterness of the conflict between Communists and their
opponents, within as well as between states, the issue may be expected
to arise again, and with the shoe on the other foot as a fugitive resists
extradition demanded by a Communist government. The Eisler pro-
ceedings therefore suggest the advisability of reevaluating the safe-
guards provided for political dissidents under existing treaties and
municipal law.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 3
Eisler, an Austrian national, arrived in the United States in 1941
and was admitted as a political refugee in transit to Mexico. He re-
mained in the United States throughout the war. In 1946 he applied
t Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania.
1. See 4 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 ef scq. (1942) ; 1 OrrEN-
HErn, INTERNATioNAL LAW 640 (Lauterpacht ed. 1948). See also HARVARD RESnARCH IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, EXTIADITION, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. SurP. 80 ea seq. (1935).
2. Extradition laws and treaties commonly provide exemption from extradition for
persons accused of "political crimes" and also for those whose surrender is sought with a
view to trying or punishing them for acts of a political character. See note 31 infra.
3. See Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ; United States v.
Eisler, 75 F. Supp. 640 (D.D.C. 1948); Report of Hearing, Bow St. Magistrate's
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to the Department of State for permission to return to Germany, a
procedure then required of all aliens wishing to leave the United
States. On July 31, 1946 he was granted an exit permit.
On January 24, 1947, however, the House Committee on Un-Amer-
ican Activities summoned him to appear before it as a witness, publicly
proclaiming him to be the "No. 1 Communist" in the United States.
The Attorney-General was asked to prevent Eisler from leaving the
country and to assure his appearance. Immigration officers arrested
him and on February 6th brought him before the Committee. Eisler
refused to be sworn in unless he were allowed to make a preliminary
statement; the Committee's chairman refused to permit the statement
unless Eisler was first sworn. As a result Eisler was dismissed without
testifying and the Committee voted to cite him for contempt of Con-
gress. On February 27th an indictment for contempt was returned; a
jury in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia found
him guilty. The court of appeals by a 2-1 decision affirmed the judg-
ment on June 14, 1948. 4 Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court
on November 8, 1948 but Eisler fled the country before the decision was
made.
In the meantime, Eisler had been tried for a second offense, making
false statements in his application to depart from the United States.5
The Department of Justice secured an indictment on this and two
similar counts on April 14, 1947 while the trial for contempt of Con-
gress was pending. The indictment charged that Eisler in response to
questions on the application had concealed his affiliation with the
Communist Party, his residence in the United States prior to 1941,
and his former use of various "aliases," thereby violating Section 223,
Title 22 of the United States Criminal Code which makes it a criminal
offense "knowingly to make any false statement in an application for
permission to depart from or enter the United States with intent to
induce or secure the granting of such permission." 0 After a month's
Court, London, May 27, 1949, Case of Gerhard Eisler. A transcript of the latter was for-
'warded to the United States Department of State by the United States Embassy in Lon-
don, and the Legal Division of the Department kindly permitted the writer to read it.
4. Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
5. United States v. Eisler, 75 F. Supp. 640 (D.D.C. 1948) ; also same case, 75 F.
Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1947).
6. 40 STAT. 559 (1918), as amended, 55 STAT. 252 (1941), 22 U.S.C. § 23 (1946).
The related counts on which Eisler was charged were: "knowingly and wilfully making
and using a false affidavit knowing the same to contain fraudulent and fictitious statements
in a matter within the jurisdiction of the Department of State" in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 80 (1946); and "knowingly and wilfully making and causing to be made false and,
fraudulent statements and representations in a matter within the jurisdiction of the De-
partment of State' also in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 80 (1946). The trial judge ruled that
these counts could be dismissed as they were grounded upon the same alleged false state-
ment and were each addressed to the identical wrongful act. United States v. Eisler, 75 F.
Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1947).
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trial Eisler was convicted but consideration of various defense motions
delayed sentence until March 24, 1948. Eisler appealed, and his con-
viction was affirmed by the court of appeals on April 18, 1949.7 A
delay again ensued as Eisler moved for a rehearing. Finally on May 6,
1949, the circuit court denied the motion. On the same day Eisler
fled the United States on the Polish steamship Batory. Notification of
Eisler's presence on board was given the next day.'
The Department of Justice immediately requested the Department
of State to seek Eisler's extradition. The British government was asked
to seize Eisler upon the arrival of the Batory at Southampton and hold
him for extradition under the British-United States Extradition
Treaty of 1931. This was done on May 14 despite vehement objec-
tions by the ship's captain and physical resistance by Eisler.' The
Polish Embassy strenuously protested this act as "forcible abduction"
in "violation of the Polish sovereign flag." 10 The British authorities
nevertheless kept Eisler in custody, and remanded him to Bow Street
Magistrate's Court, London, for a hearing on the extradition request.
At the hearing, on May 27, 1949, Sir Valentine Holmes, representing
the United States, argued that Eisler should be extradited because he
had been convicted of an offense tantamount to perjury, an extradita-
ble crime under the treaty and the British Extradition Act." The
magistrate, Sir Laurence Dunne, found, however, that the evidence
failed to show that Eisler's offense corresponded to perjury as defined
by English law. Inasmuch as both the treaty and the statute provided
for extradition only when the act charged constituted an extraditable
offense under the law of the territory where the fugitive was found,
12
Eisler was ordered released forthwith.
The American Government thereupon dropped the matter, except
for a rigorous investigation of the officials and crew of the Batory upon
its return to the United States to determine whether there had been
complicity in Eisler's escape.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF DOUBLE CRIMINALITY:
AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIFT
The American case for extradition assumed a broad interpretation
of the double criminality test. Judicial precedent for this view was set
7. Report of Hearing, Bow St. Magistrate's Court, supra note 3.
8. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1949, p. 1, col. 6-7.
9. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1949, p. 1, col. 8.
10. N.Y. Times, May 16, 1949, p. 1, col. 8.
11. British-United States Extradition Treaty, Dec. 22, 1931, 163 LEAGUE OF NATIONS
TREATY SoRms 59, Art. 3(14) (1935); Extradition Act, 1873, 36 & 37 VicT. c. 60, § 8
schedule.
12. British-United States Extradition Treaty, supra note 11, Art. 9; Extradition Act,
1870, 33 & 34 Vicr. c. 52, § 10, §26; also Act of 1873, mtpra note 11.
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by the case of Factor v. Laubenheinwr.13 In this case, the British govern-
ment had requested extradition of a person charged with receiving
money, knowing that it had been fraudulently obtained. The criminal
law of Illinois, where Factor was found, did not cover such an offense.
Nevertheless, a majority of the United States Supreme Court held that
he was extraditable on the ground that the offense was named in the
treaty and was recognized as a crime "by the jurisprudence of both
countries." 14
The Supreme Court in effect set aside the treaty requirement of
double criminality in the interest of British justice, declaring that:
"The obligation to do what some nations have done voluntarily,
in the interest of justice and friendly international relationships
. . . should be construed more liberally than a criminal statute or
the technical requirements of criminal procedure. . . . It has been
the policy of our own government, as of others, in entering into
extradition treaties, to name as treaty offenses only those generally
recognized as criminal by the laws in force within its own territory.
But that policy when carried into effect by treaty designation of
offenses with respect to which extradition is to be granted, affords
no adequate basis for declining to construe the treaty in accordance
with its language, or for saying that its obligation, in the absence of
some express requirement, is conditioned on the criminality of the
offense charged according to the laws of the particular place of
asylum." 15
The State Department failed to anticipate that the British court
would adopt a strict construction of double criminality instead of
reciprocating the liberal interpretation in the Factor case. They had
undertaken the extradition proceedings as more or less routine and
expected little difficulty, especially as the conviction of Eisler obviated
the necessity of making out a prima facie case supporting the accusa-
tion against him. The conviction for contempt of Congress did not
figure in the extradition proceedings because this offense clearly lay
entirely outside the enumerated list of extraditable offenses in the
13. 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
14. A critical view of this decision is taken by Manley 0. Hudson, The Factor Case
and Double Criminality in Extradition, 28 AL. J. INeT' L. 274 (1934). Hudson main-
tains that the Court's opinion did not take adequate account of the history of Anglo-
American extradition law nor of the principles of international law and cautions that such
a liberal construction of extradition treaties undermines the safeguards set up for protec-
tion of both nationals and aliens. On the other hand, Edwin Borchard, The Factor Ex-
tradition Case, 28 Am. J. Ir'xL L. 742 (1934), defends the decision as in the interest of
the administration of justice and in accordance with the intended purpose of the treaty to
suppress crime. He asserts that the requirement of double criminality is not a rule of
international law and that strict construction of the Anglo-American treat), provision is
not essential in order to establish extraditability.
15. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 298 (1933).
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Extradition Treaty. But Sir Valentine Holmes proposed to prove that
the false statements on the application to depart from the United
States had been "made for the purposes of a proceeding before a person
having power to hear, receive, and examine evidence on oath" and
would, therefore, have warranted a charge of perjury under Section 1
of the British Perjury Act of 1911 11 had the offense been committed in
England. This would satisfy the requirement of double criminality
insofar as English law was concerned. In regard to the nature of the
offense under American law, Holmes argued that even though Eisler
had not actually been convicted of the technical charge of perjury, the
facts would have warranted such a charge if the Department of Justice
had chosen to prosecute on this basis.17
The defense insisted that important elements of perjury were absent
under British law. It claimed that Eisler had not been lawfully sworn,
nor had his statements been made as a witness or as an interpreter in a
judicial proceeding as required by British law. "It is a complete abuse
of the language," declared Mr. Pritt, the defense counsel, "to describe
a man who is making application on a printed paper sent up from New
York to Washington to say that that person is a witness."
The magistrate agreed that Eisler's offense could not be considered
to have taken place in the course of a judicial proceeding; hence it did
not constitute perjury according to English law and was not an extradi-
tion crime. The proceeding, in which Eisler had been involved, said
Sir Laurence Dunne, had been "purely an administrative action per-
formed by the officer in question. He was taking and recording state-
ments of Mr. Eisler." Though the officer may have had legal authority
to receive evidence under oath, this did not give him judicial capacity
under English law.'8 Even if a false statement under such circum-
stances might be perjury in the United States, it was only "akin to
perjury" in England. To Sir Valentine Holmes' remonstrance that
the court was under obligation to construe the provisions of the treaty
and statute liberally, the magistrate replied that it would require
altogether too liberal a construction of the meaning of perjury under
16. Section 1 of this act provides that "If any person lawfully sworn as a witness or
as an interpreter in a judicial proceeding wilfully makes a statement material in that
proceeding, which he knows to be false or does not believe to be true, he shall be guilty of
perjury. . . ." The term "judicial proceeding" is defined by the Act as including "a pro-
ceeding before any court, tribunal or person having by law power to hear, receive and ex-
amine evidence on oath." Perjury Act, 1911, 1 & 2 GEo. 5, c. 6, §§ 1(1), 1(2).
17. In contrast to British law, see note 16 supra, United States law provides that per-
jury may include any false statement made under oath before a competent tribunal, officer
or person where the oath is required by law. 35 STAT. 1111 (1909), 18 U.S.C. 231 (1946).
Perjury in the United States is thus not restricted to statements material in a judicial
proceeding.
18. The magistrate noted that in England an administrative official would only ba
acting in a judicial capacity if he were participating in a ministerial tribunal or inquiry.
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British law to hold Eisler for extradition. He dismissed a plea for an
adjournment to permit the securing of further evidence asserting that
it was "abundantly clear that in no circumstances whatever could
that offence of which Mr. Eisler was convicted in America be brought
under the technical head of perjury in this country." 19
In insisting on a strict application of the principle of double crimi-
nality, Sir Laurence Dunne conformed not only to the letter of British
law but to the main trend of British judicial practice. Extradition by
England is dependent entirely upon the statutory authority granted
by the Extradition Act of 1870 and its amendments. 1 This act author-
izes extradition of persons convicted or accused of specifically desig-
nated "extradition crimes" but only if "such evidence is produced
as ...would, according to the law of England, prove that the prisoner
was convicted of such crime. ... 21 By the Act of 1873, perjury was
included in the list of extraditable crimes, but with the specific proviso
that:
"The following list of crimes is to be construed according to the
law existing in England or in a British possession (as the case may
be) at the date of the alleged crime, whether by common law or by
statute made before or after the passing of this Act." 22
The governing statute is therefore explicit that the construction of the
criminal nature of an act for which extradition is requested shall be
made according to the law of England; and so construed, it must con-
form to an offense specifically designated in the statute.
In pursuance of the Extradition Act, the British-United States
Treaty of 1931 specifies clearly that
"extradition shall take place only if the evidence be found sufficient,
according to the law of the High Contracting Party applied to ...
to prove ... that the crime or offense of which he has been con-
victed is one in respect of which extradition could, at the time of
such conviction, have been granted by the High Contracting
Party applied to." 23
19. Report of Hearing, Bow St. Magistrate's Court, .mpra note 3.
20. See 8 HALSBURY's STATUTES OF ENGLAND 449 (1929). The statute rather than
the treaty is held in England to be the ultimate source of authority in regard to extradi-
tion. The statute actually defines the permissible limits of treaty obligations which may
be undertaken by the government, rather than providing simply for the implementation of
treaty commitments. In contrast, treaties in the United States automatically become part
of the law of the land and are therefore essentially self-executing.
21. Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vxcr. c. 52, § 10. Some disagreement has arisen
over the intent of this provision. It has been urged that only the sufficiency of the evi-
dence produced need be tested "according to the law of England." On the other hand,
the provision has been held to apply the law of England to determining the criminality of
the act charged. The latter view appears to be more generally accepted. See Hudson,
supra note 14.
22. Extradition Act, 1873,36 & 37 Vrcr. c. 60, § 8 schedule.
23. British-United States Extradition Treaty, supra note 11, Art 9.
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Thus an offense is extraditable under the treaty only if it is so con-
sidered by the law of the state of asylum.
British courts furthermore have customarily made a careful deter-
mination of whether an alleged offense would constitute, according to
English law, one of the crimes for which extradition was provided by
treaty. Thus in King v. Dix 24 extradition was refused on a charge of
larceny because the "charge disclosed no offense according to the law
of England"; but on a second charge, "embezzlement in the State of
Washington," the prisoner was considered extraditable because the
crime corresponded directly to "fraud" in England, which was covered
by the extradition treaty and statute. In the case of Ex parte Windsor 25
a prisoner wanted in the United States for forgery was discharged be-
cause the offense charged was held not to be forgery by the law of
England.
Until the Factor case American judicial practice had followed a
closely parallel development on the issue of double criminality. Courts
held that an offense was extraditable only if it was named in the rel-
evant treaty and if such an act was considered criminal under the laws
of the particular state of the United States where tile fugitive was
found. Decisions as to extraditability were' usually based upon quite
precise construction of the relevant state statutes and avoided any
undue "stretching" of the established statutory definition of crimes
to encompass particular offenses for which extradition was claimed. 0
The decision in the Eisler case has been criticized on the grounds
24. 18 T.L.R. 231 (K.B. 1902).
25. 12 L.T. 307 (Q.B. 1865).
26. See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40
(1903). The. Factor case reversed this approach. But the HARvARD REsEARCU, op. Cit.
stpra note 1, at 80 et seq., found the principle of double criminality so generally accepted
among states throughout Europe and America that it introduced it in its Draft Conven-
tion on Extraditions.
Neither British nor United States courts have required that an offense be defined
identically by the laws of the demanding and asylum states, so long as the particular act
charged is in substance an extraditable crime in both states. See 4 HAcKwoRTH, op. cit.
supra. note 1, at 42 et seq.; 8 HALSBURY'S STrasTUE OF ENGLAND 460 (1929). For instance,
in Collins v. Loisel, mtpra, the United States Supreme Court declared that "the law
does not require that the name by which the crime is described in the two countries
shall be the same; nor that the scope of liability shall be coextensive, or, in other respects,
the same in the two countries. It is enough if the particular act charged is criminal in
both jurisdictions." See also Kelly v. Griffin, 241 U.S. 6 (1916). The British rule is
similar. Reg. v. Jacobi & Hiller, 46 L.T. 595 n. (a) (Q.B, 1881); In re Bellencontre,
[1891] 2 Q.B. 122.
In the Eisler case, however, the issue was a matter of substance, not terminology.
The question was whether the particular false statements had been material in a judicial
proceeding, and thus was an important part of the definition of perjury under British law.
To have disregarded this element would have in effect amounted to judicial modification
of the substance of the law, not just the equating of different words whose essential mean-
ing was the same.
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that Eisler's offense, even if it may not have been perjury, corresponded
to a "kindred offense" as defined by the British Perjury Act and should
therefore have been considered extraditable. - Sir Laurence Dunne
himself admitted that the offense might be "akin to perjury" and the
language of the statute corroborates such a conclusion.? But the
British-United States Extradition Treaty of 1931 names only "perjury"
as extraditable. To assume that the treaty was also intended to cover
related offenses appears unwarranted in the absence of any provision
to that effect and in view of the clear and precise distinction drawn
by British law between perjury and kindred offenses. The Perjury Act
of 1911 and British judicial practice have established specific criteria
for the determination of perjury, which make it substanlitdy a different
crime from a "kindred offense." For instance, the criterion of perjury
that a false statement shall have been made in a judicial proceeding
does not apply to a kindred offense. Such a distinction appears suffi-
ciently important to justify the restriction of extradition to the crime
actually specified in the treaty and statute. Actually, counsel for the
United States did not undertake to argue that kindred offenses should
be held extraditable, but only attempted to prove that Eisler's action
would have constituted real perjury if committed in England.
Barring fundamental statutory revision by Parliament, Britain will
undoubtedly continue to limit its obligation to extradite to offenses
which, by the definition of British law, constituted crimes specified in
its extradition treaties. Such a stand may block substantial progress
toward the codification and development of a widely applicable inter-
national law of extradition. Effective multilateral action on extradi-
tion demands a generally acceptable standard of reference to determine
extraditability. As most states are hardly ready to give automatic
effect to each other's criminal laws and extradite merely on evidence
that a person has been accused of a crime in, another country, the
standard of double criminality seems unavoidable. Unless extraditabil-
ity is based on the degree of penalty provided for the offense rather
than on the nature of the offense,2 9 strict application of the test of
double criminality will limit extradition on a multilateral basis to
those offenses which are similarly defined in the various municipal
27. See Finch, The Eisler Extradition Case, 43 A. J. I"z'L L 487 (1949).
28. Section 2 of the British Perjury Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Gro. 5, c. 6, provides that if any
person, being required or authorized by law to make any statement on oath for any pur-
pose, and being lawfully sworn (otherwise than in a judicial proceeding) wilfully makes
a statement which is material for that purpose and -which he kmows to be false or does
not believe to be true, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
29. The Hnvmw RESEARCH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 74 et seq. has proposed basing
extraditability on the severity of the penalty provided by the two states concerned for the
offense in question, regardless of the definition of its nature. Such a test of ex-traditability
is allowed by some countries, e.g., France, see 2 DALLoz, NoUVEAu REFIRroms DE Drorr
476 et seq. (1948) (Law of March 10, 1927) but its acceptance is not general.
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criminal codes. This means that a very narrow range of crimes can be
covered because discrepancies between national legal systems are sub-
stantial in defining criminal offenses (often far greater than in the
definition of perjury by British and American law discussed above).
Reconciliation between the British test of double criminality as ap-
plied in the Eisler case and a multilateral standard of extraditability
may therefore be beyond realization.
EXEMPTION FROM POLITICALLY INSPIRED EXTRADITION
Modem extradition law has been solicitous of political fugitives.
Three provisions inserted in most extradition treaties have safe-
guarded the political dissident against being returned for punishment
to the country from which he escaped. First, persons accused of of-
fenses "of a political character" are not usually extraditable. Second,
the offender may not be prosecuted or punished for an offense other
than that for which he is extradited, unless he is first given an oppor-
tunity to leave the country upon completing his sentence for the ex-
tradited offense. Thus he is presumably protected against prosecution
for a political crime after being extradited for a non-political one.
Finally, extradition may be denied if shown to be requested for the
purpose of punishing a person for a political offense.ao All of these
provisions appear both in the British Extradition Act and in the
British-United States Extradition Treaty of 1931."'
The implications of the first of these provisions have been exten-
sively, though not uniformly, determined in a long record of cases.
30. These provisions were developed during the 19th century as a result of vigorous
public protest against the surrender of fugitives who had been engaged in unsuccessful
democratic revolutioins against monarchical governments. See 4 HACKWORTU, op. Cit.
supra note 1, at 45 et seq.; HARVARD RESEARCH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 108 et seq.; I
OPPENHEIm, op. cit. supra note 1, at 643 et seq.
31. Section 3 of the Extradition Act of 1870, 33 & 34 VicT., c. 60, provides that "A
fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the offense in respect of which his surrender
is demanded is one of a political character, or if he prove to the satisfaction of the police
magistrate or the court before whom he is brought on habeas corpus, or to the Secretary
of State, that the requisition for his surrender has in fact been made with a view to try
or punish him for an offense of a political character." Section 9 reads: "The police
magistrate shall receive any evidence which may be tendered to show that the crime of
which the prisoner is accused or alleged to have been convicted is an offense of a political
character or is not an extradition crime."
Article 6 of the British-United States Extradition Treaty of 1931, supra note 11,
makes almost the identical provision as § 3 of the statute quoted above. Article 7 of the
Treaty provides further that "A person surrendered can in no case be kept in custody or
be brought to trial in the territory of the High Contracting Party to whom the surrender
has been made for any other crime or offense or on account of any other matters than
those for which the extradition shall have taken place until he has been restored or has
had an opportunity of returning to the territories of the High Contracting Party by whom
he has been surrendered."
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Practice has differed between countries with reference to such issues as
the extraditability of "mixed" offenses which include both political and
criminal aspects. But there is general agreement regarding certain
basic tests of the political character of an offense. To be so held, for in-
stance, it must be incident to and form a part of a political disturbance
and the offender must have been involved in an organized movement
or party seeking to impose a government of its choice in opposition to
that favored by an opposing group or to the government in power.32
On the whole, substantial protection has been afforded to persons who
have committed crimes in the course of bona fide political agitation.
33
Eisler made no claim to exemption under this provision. His con-
tention was not that the offense was political but that the prosecutions
were of a political character. Had the decision not gone off on the
issue of double criminality, this would have warranted careful con-
sideration of the applicability of the other statutory and treaty pro-
visions concerning the exemption of political offenders.
Eisler's prosecutions and convictions appear inseparable from his
Communist activities and affiliations, even though his political actions
were not the purported subject of the criminal charge against him.
His appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activi-
ties which led to his conviction for contempt of Congress was unques-
tionably ordered because of his reputed Communist activities. Re-
fusal of the Committee chairman to allow Eisler to make an initial
statement before taking the oath as a witness probably reflected an-
tagonism towards Eisler because of his political beliefs and may even
have lacked legal authority.34 The second indictment against Eisler-
for false statement--occurred only after the prosecution for contempt
was under way, when the man had become a cause caabre and the
Department of Justice was under heavy congressional and public
32. See 8 HALSBJRY's STATUTES o EN azi.N 454 (1929); 35 CJ.S. 357 (1943).
33. See 4 HAcKwonm, op. cit. supra note 1, at 45 et seq.; HARVArD RES.AnIC, op. Cit.
supra note 1, at 107 et seq.; 1 OPPENH Xm, op. cit. supra note 1, at 646 et seq. A careful
study of the subject is Deere, Political Offenses in the Law and Practice of Extradition,
27 Am. J. INTL L. 247-70 (1933).
34. In dissenting from the decision of the circuit court affirming Eisier's conviction
for contempt, Judge Prettyman maintained that Eisler was entitled to prove what he in-
tended to say to the Committee before being sworn and that he should not automatically
have been held in default because he had clearly indicated his readiness to answer the
Committee's questions. Furthermore, the Judge asserted, the Government had failed to
prove that Eiler wras summoned to testify in a matter of inquiry within the competence
of the Committee. See Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (dis-
senting opinion).
The purpose of the hearing (to investigate Communist activities), the Committee's
action in causing the prior arrest of Eisler, its public accusation of Eisler as the No. 1
Communist leader in the United States and its peremptory dismissal of the witness on a
technicality of procedure give a strong presumption of political bias to the Committee's
citation of Eisler for contempt.
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pressure to do something about Communists. This indictment was
returned almost nine months after the State Department had approved
of Eisler's departure, and the official responsible for this approval
admitted during the trial that the Department had had in its files,
at the time the decision was made, full accurate information on the
questions to which Eisler had made false answer. In other words,
although the Government had long known of Eisler's offense, it had
refrained from prosecution until his public expos6 as a Communist;
in fact he had actually been granted permission to depart from the
United States.35 Such circumstances, coupled with journalistic notori-
ety, gave the Eisler trials an unmistakable political connotation, even
if they were not directly instigated for political reasons.
Would such a background be sufficient to establish an exemption
under either of the latter tvo treaty provisions concerning political
fugitives? Neither of these provisions has had a settled record of inter-
pretation and application. They have been considered in only a few
cases and the courts have avoided conclusive judgments on them. The
effect of such decisions as have been made is to decrease rather than
increase the assurance of protection for the political fugitive.
In the first place, the courts have assumed a very modest view of
their judicial competence when faced with the plea that the govern-
ment requesting extradition is politically motivated. They have de-
clined to hear evidence on the matter, passing on to the executive
branch the ticklish responsibility of inquiring into another state's
possible ulterior motives. When Britain requested the extradition of
Ignatius T. T. Lincoln during the First World War, the defendant
argued that the action was really prompted by a desire to punish him
for and to interfere with his public utterances and writings in the
United 'States which were politically antagonistic to Britain. The
court denied Lincoln leave to prove that the prosecution would be
politically animated, declaring:
"[I]t is not part of the court proceedings nor of the hearing upon
the charge of crime to exercise discretion as to whether the crim-
inal charge is a cloak for political action, nor whether the request is
35. The trial judge appears to have been considerably disturbed by the above evidence
as it bore upon defense motion to arrest judgment, which was based in part on the claim
that Eisler's statement could hardly have been material to the proceeding, if the knowledge
of the true circumstances was in the hands of the Department of State when the decision
was made. The judge admitted that there was "no satisfactory explanation in the record
as to why this action was taken and for that matter the testimony of the witness to whom
had been delegated the authority to act was confused and conflicting respecting the issu-
ance of the notice." Nevertheless the judge dismissed the motion holding that it was a
matter for the jury to decide whether the concealment had induced the granting of the




made in good faith. Such matters should be left to the Department
of State....
"It is thought by the Court that application to the Secretary
of State of the United States will furnish full protection against the
delivery of the accused to any government which will not live up to
its treaty obligations, and that the Secretary of State will be fully
satisfied (before delivering the accused to the demanding govern-
ment) that he is wanted (in the legal sense of that term) upon a
criminal charge, that it is not sought to secure him from a country
upon which he is depending as an asylum because of political mat-
ters, and that the treaty is not actually used as a subterfuge." z
This decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme CourtY1
Where British and American courts have undertaken to rule on the
plea that extradition was politically motivated, they have hesitated to
question the good faith of the requesting state in regard to honoring
its treaty obligations. Only compelling evidence could establish the
ulterior intent of the demanding state to prosecute or punish the fugi-
tive for political considerations. As a matter of fact, in no British or
American case does it appear that the accused has been able to con-
vince the court that he should be released on this premise. In one
instance a British court gave the matter serious consideration when
the defendant argued that if he were returned to France he would have
to undergo interrogation with reference to political secrets which he"
had formerly refused to disclose, and that if he should again refuse, he
would be punished. 3 Lord Russell well understood the import of the
charge:
"[It] means that a person having committed an offense of a political
character another and wholly different charge (which does come
within both the Extradition Act and the treaty) is resorted to as a
pretence and excuse for demanding his extradition in order that he
may be tried and punished for the offense of a political character
which he has already committed." 3
The judge, however, could find no evidence to warrant the conclusion
"that the requisition for extradition is made with a view to punish the
prisoner for such an offense." A somewhat similar question was raised
but not decided with reference to a request by the Nazi Government of
Germany in 1934 for extradition of a Jewish professor residing in the
United St~tes 0 The accused resisted extradition on the grounds that
the anti-Semitic policy of the German government would prevent his
receiving a fair trial. The court referred the issue to the Department
36. In re Lincoln, 228 Fed. 70, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1915).
37. 241 U.S. 651 (1916).
38. In re Arton, [1896] 1 Q.B. 108 (1895).
39. Id. at 114.
40. In re Normano, 7 F. Supp. 329 (D. Mass. 1934).
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of State for inquiry, but released the defendant before a report was
received because the time limit for holding him had expired.
Thus there is still lacking an adequate judicial determination of the
sufficiency of evidence necessary to establish ulterior political motiva-
tion on the part of a government requesting extradition. Considering
the gravity of such an imputation, insistence by the courts on convinc-
ing evidence to support the claim is understandable. But it means
that as yet there is no assurance as to the legal effect of the exemption
purportedly provided by British and American treaty and statute for a
political fugitive from extradition for an essentially political purpose.
Pending further development of precedent in such cases, perhaps
the cautious and strict interpretation of extraditability followed by
the British in regard to the requirement of double criminality and the
limitation of extradition to specific offenses named in treaties may be
justified. Indirectly, such strict interpretation and limitation pro-
vide a safeguard for political dissidents fleeing from persecution by
powers-that-be. The misfire of the Eisler extradition may actually
benefit others on the opposite side of the ideological conflict whose
extradition may be demanded for non-political crimes but who would
face upon their return, stringent penalties for their political recalci-
trance. For the Eisler decision demonstrates the possibility of relying
in certain situations on a well-established, if conservative, test of
extraditability-double criminality-where a ruling on the test of
political motivation of the requesting government might be embarrass-
ing as well as novel.
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